analysis 265
rare for family law, and in particular family law relating to a traditional, opposite sex, married couple, to make the headlines, but it certainly did with the decision of the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino, 3 an appeal which hinted at a change of fortune for the marriage contract.
A. THE FACTS
In 1998, the marriage took place in London of a German woman, of good family and independent means, and a French man, with "excellent prospects". 4 She came from an extremely wealthy family, from whom she had already acquired considerable independent assets, providing her with "substantial unearned income", 5 and from whom she would receive more in the future. He was a banker, with an annual income of £120,000 and an expectation of higher future rewards. The couple had two daughters but drifted apart and, in 2006, they separated. Divorce was granted in 2007 and, in terms of a shared residence order, the children were to live with their father for approximately one third of the time and with their mother for the remainder.
Several months before the wedding, the parties entered into an ante-nuptial marriage contract at the suggestion of the woman, whose father "insisted" upon it and who herself was "anxious that the husband should show, by entering into the agreement, that he was marrying her for love and not for money". 6 Despite this antenuptial agreement, in which they had agreed to a mutual waiver of any kind of claims for maintenance on divorce, "to the fullest extent permitted by law" and regardless of whether either party was "in serious difficulties", 7 the husband sought ancillary relief, in the form of a lump sum and periodical allowance. In awarding him a total of £5,560,000, Baron J held that factors surrounding the conclusion of the agreement and, in particular the fact that it failed to meet a number of safeguards proposed in an earlier Home Office consultation document on marital agreements, 8 resulted in reduced weight being given to the agreement.
The wife subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that Baron J had erred in finding that the ante-nuptial agreement should be of reduced value in light of the circumstances surrounding it. The sum awarded was significantly reduced to reflect only the husband's ongoing role as a father and not to make provision for his own needs. 9 It was the subsequent appeal against that decision which presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to consider this particular ante-nuptial agreement and to contribute more broadly to the law, and debate, in this area. 
B. THE DECISION
This case is the latest stage in the developing English jurisprudence on the nature and legal status of ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements. 10 The specific consideration of ante-nuptial agreements is set against a broader background of the current provisions of English law for ancillary relief. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended, gives the court power to make a range of orders, including a lump sum or periodical payments.
11 In making such orders the court is directed to take into account all of the circumstances of the case and in particular to have regard to a range of matters set out in section 25 13 in which the guiding principles relating to ancillary relief were expressed as fairness, compensation and sharing.
The Supreme Court in Radmacher focused on two key issues: the distinction, if any, between different types of marital agreements, in particular between those concluded before and after marriage, and, in the context of a subsequent application for ancillary relief, "the question of the principles to be applied by the court when considering the weight that should be attached to an ante-nuptial agreement".
14 The majority judgment of the court was presented by Lord Phillips, with a separate short judgment being delivered by Lord Mance and a longer, fully reasoned and partially dissenting judgment from Lady Hale.
In essence, the Supreme Court concluded that there should be no general distinction between ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements. 15 Building on previous jurisprudence 16 to the effect that agreements should be taken into account by a court in assessing an application for ancillary relief, they sought to assess the impact in this particular case of factors surrounding the execution of the agreement and, in so doing, set out more general guidance which can be summarised in their conclusion that:
17
The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.
C. A PECULIARLY ENGLISH PROBLEM?
At the outset, the Supreme Court acknowledged that English law differs "significantly from the rest of Europe and most other jurisdictions".
18 English law's singularity in this substantive area is evident, for example, in the context of the current search by the Commission for European Family Law for common European principles in matrimonial property. 19 The different approach of English law, when compared to its European neighbours, is evident too in its preference for its own law as the applicable law, regardless of domicile of the parties or in this case the parties' choice of law, 20 and in the United Kingdom's decision not to be bound by the Hague Protocol. 21 Differences between Scots and English law in this area abound, both in terms of the legal framework for financial provision on divorce and in the specific context of nuptial agreements. In Radmacher, the first obstacle to enforceability of the antenuptial agreement was a lingering uncertainty stemming from "the old rule that agreements providing for future separation are contrary to public policy".
22 Such agreements, in Scotland, have never been regarded as contrary to public policy and it is clear that spouses may reach agreement in terms of financial provision on divorce, with the court having only very limited power to vary or set aside an agreement where it is regarded as not having been "fair and reasonable at the time it was entered into". 23 Not only are there strong indications in favour of the legality and enforceability of such agreements in Scotland, together with very limited opportunities for judicial interference, but the underlying statutory framework for financial provision on divorce seeks to provide clear principles 24 and by so doing to reduce judicial discretion; thus creating an environment which will encourage private agreement safe in the knowledge of the likely outcome of judicial resolution.
To that extent, the particular problems with English law that were encountered in Radmacher are alien to Scots family lawyers. It might be argued, however, that it is not in the detailed legal analysis offered by the Supreme Court, but in the allusions to the relationship of marriage and its potential discord with commercial values, 25 that the shared concerns of different jurisdictions emerge. As Lady Hale highlights, it should not be forgotten that "the object of an ante-nuptial agreement is to deny the economically weaker spouse the provision to which she -it is usually although by no means invariably she -would otherwise be entitled".
26

D. CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS
Having concluded that there was no need to distinguish between ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements, the Supreme Court considered briefly whether they needed to take a step further and address the distinction between an "agreement" and a "contract". They quickly concluded that such a distinction was a "red herring" 27 and, with relief, moved on. Having decided that nuptial agreements, of whatever type, were enforceable, subject always to fairness, they were not required to enter into detailed consideration of their contractual status. The issue of intention to create legal relations was important but it was the intention to create an enforceable obligation, rather than specifically to establish a contract, that was required.
28
While respecting the principle of autonomy, the court acknowledged the uncomfortable juxtaposition of commercial minds and personal emotion. In the account of how the parties approached the conclusion of the agreement in Radmacher, the complexities of personal and financial relationships are clear: 29 Although the judge was sure that the wife wanted her husband to love her for herself, the wife emphasised her father's insistence, because she felt it made her seem less insensitive to her future spouse, given that the terms excluded all his potential rights . . . The judge found that the husband was eager to comply because he did not want the wife to be disinherited, he wanted to marry her.
"Family relationships are not like straightforward commercial relationships" 30 and in deciding what weight should be given to an agreement, in the context of an application for ancillary relief, the court should take into account not only the formal vitiating factors associated with contracts, such as undue influence and misrepresentation but the lesser albeit more complex problems which may stem from the personal relationship between the parties.
31
As an isolated case, Radmacher would be easy to dismiss as having more to do with the preservation of family business and wealth than the relationship of marriage, but the decision comes at a time of review and proposed reform on a much wider scale. The research of the English Law Commission into matrimonial agreements, together with the Family Justice Review and the anticipated reforms resulting from it, place greater emphasis on mediation and consensus and suggest that there is under way in England a significant shift away from the family courts and in favour of private ordering. While there is much to be welcomed in a system that encourages and supports individual negotiation and settlement, Lady Hale's reservations and concerns, merit careful consideration. There is a simplicity and clarity in developing rules and principles which apply to all marital agreements and in moving towards a presumption of enforceability, but the diversity in terms of intention, circumstance, bargaining power and need should not be overlooked.
E. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
When ante-nuptial marriage contracts were last in vogue, in the days prior to the reforms of the Married Women's Property Acts, they were a means of avoiding 
